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RATIONAL NATIONAL SECURITY
GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, (USA-RET)
(Editor's Note: General Maxwell D. Taylor,
USA Retired, visited Carlisle Barracks on 19
June 1972 to make his twenty-second
appearance as a guest lecturer before the US
Army War College faculty and students. A s
the Keynote Speaker for the Midcourse
Resident Phase o f the Nonresident Class o f
1973, General Taylor asked that we question
our view o f national security today in a
c o n t e x t which exceeds our traditional
consideration o f a military challenge b y a
General Maxwell D. Taylor was born in Keytesville,
Missouri on 26 August 1901. Following graduation
from the US Military Academy in 1922 he served with
the Corps of Engineers and the Field Artillery in a
variety of assignments, and as an instructor at the
Military Academy. He served with the 82d Airborne
Division during the Sicilian and Italian campaigns. In
1944 he assumed command of the 101st Airborne
Division. In 1945 he returned to the Military Academy
where he served as Superintendent until 1949 when he
became Chief of Staff of the European Command. In
1953 he became the Commanding General of Eighth
US Army in Korea and rose t o the position of
Commander in Chief, Far East Command and United
Nations Command in 1955. From 1955 until his
retirement on 30 June 1959, General Taylor served as
Chief of Staff, United States Army.
President Kennedy recalled him to active duty in
1961 and he served as the Military Representative to
the President until 1962 when he was designated as
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; he served in that
position until 1964. Serving for President Johnson, he
was the US Ambassador to South Vietnam during
1964-1965, after which he was a Special Presidential
Consultant on Diplomatic and Military Affairs until
1969. Concurrently, he was
the President, Institute for
Defense Analyses in
Washington; and a member,
and later Chairman of the
P r e s i d e n t ' s Foreign
lntelligence Advisory Board.
Although now retired, General
Taylor is still vigorous in his
i n t e r e s t s a n d has j u s t
published a new hook entitled
Swords and Plowshares.

military power which is conducted b y
m i l i t a r y m e thods. Addressing strategic
retaliatory forces, volunteer reaction forces
and the internal threat, General Taylor
outlined a program he feels the Nation should
follow.
This superb address was so well received by
the student body and faculty that the
Commandant requested permission to publish
it in Parameters so that more could benefit
from this realistic approach.)

General Davis and Gentlemen of the College:
It is always a pleasure to return to Carlisle
and meet with the class, not for the purpose
of hearing one's own voice reverberate in this
very fine hall, but primarily for the discussion
period which always follows. I confess in
advance that I am going to make some rather
broad statements in the course of my
prepared remarks without taking the time to
justify all their content; I expect you to
cross-examine me if you find my statements
need further justification.
I was reflecting, as I drove here this
morning from Washington, how fortunate this
class is to be assembled here on this day of
Our Lord to start the summer course. I do not
know of a time in our recent military or
national history when there were more new
factors bearing on our national security and
providing food for thought for all of us who
are involved in national defense and the
Armed Forces. We see change on all sides in
the readjustment of our relationships with
some of our former enemies-in the outcome
of the SALT talks, in the consequences which
we now can perceive of our experience in
Vietnam-all of which suggest the need for
reexamination and revalidation of old
concepts and procedures

-
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General Taylor shown in 1964, at a meeting in the Pentagon o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff,
with Secretary o f Defense McNamara and Deputy Secretary Vance.

My topic this morning bears on this
question of our national security, what it
should mean to us, and how we should make
provision for the problems related to it which
lie ahead. I would divide my discussion in two
parts: first, a brief discussion of our need for
a new concept, a new understanding of what
we mean by national security, feeling that the
conventional one, the traditional one if you
will, is no longer entirely adequate. Then,
having decided what the new concept should
be, we can undertake to outline the kind of
defense program which is consistent with the
concept. The latter is the second part of my
talk.
I n c i d e n t a l l y , I don't believe your
Commandant warned you that I am not
speaking for the Pentagon, or for the Army.
As I often say, I am merely an indignant
taxpayer, but one tremendously interested in
our national security as well as in where my
taxes go. So, if some of the statements I make
are highly controversial, please bear in mind

that they are not indorsed by those who have
the responsibility for making present day
decisions in this field.
NEED FOR A NEW CONCEPT OF
NATIONAL SECURITY

With regard to our conventional concept of
national security, I feel that it has become
outmoded, at least since World War II. But
since old habits linger long, I still find that
m e n in authority often talk of national
security as if it were still exclusively a
question of military defense against military
threats. Admiral Mahan said at the turn of the
century, "Every danger of a military character
to which the United States is exposed can be
best met outside her territory at sea." That
was a good statement at the time; nobody
challenged it, and I think it remained
essentially valid until World War I I and its
aftermath. But still we're inclined to think in
archaic concepts and to view national security

as essentially the protection of our own
people, of the national territory and of the
sea-lanes from the military action of hostile
nations.
Yet it takes only a moment of reflection to
realize that such a formula does not describe
what we really have to concern ourselves with
today. We have far more to protect than a
seagirt homeland. We are a great Nation with
all the trappings of world power-prestige,
alliances, bases, garrisons, investments,
commercial and political undertakings, and
relationships. We also share on a global basis
m a n y c o n c e r n s w i t h o t h e r great
powers- concerns f o r such things as
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s by ship, plane, and
electronics. We share an interest in such things
as oil, which has come to have enormous
strategic and political importance for all
industrial nations- ourselves included.
Likewise, we have a global interest in the
collection of intelligence. We don't often
t h i n k a b o u t intelligence as being a
foreign-based asset, but it is. We have many
intelligence installations and systems abroad
upon which we are critically dependent for
t h e i n f o r m a t i o n which provides our
decisionmakers with the basis for their
judgments. I mention these things just to
remind you of something we all know;
namely, that we have a vast number of targets
abroad which are vulnerable to attack, and
which represent essential assets of a great
power.
Not only do we have important exposed
values a b r o a d , b u t there are more
troublemakers about nowadays than there
used to be. One can almost feel a certain
nostalgia for the days of the monolithic
Sino-Soviet bloc, when all we had to do was
to keep a steady eye on the great danger
represented by the two great Communist
powers in combination. Multipolarity is now
the word we use to describe the new
distribution of power centers about the
world, and while it has indeed attenuated the
concentration of power formerly represented
by the Sino-Soviet bloc, multipolarity has also
created new problems for us because we have
to watch in many directions. We can no
longer afford to be the Cyclops with a single
eye in his forehead watching a single enemy;

we have to be more like Argus with his many
e y e s l o o k i n g in a l l directions,
multi-directional in our interests.
Not only are there more troublemakers to
watch, but their tactics have changed and
proliferated. We can no longer think only in
terms of war as history has shown it in the
past. We have to be prepared for violence in
many forms: major war, limited war, Cold
War, and covert or mini-aggressions. Examples
of the latter are incidents such as those in
which North Korea in 1968 shot down one of
o u r reconnaissance airplanes, or when
E q u a d o r seizes our fishing boats in
international waters-incidents of the sort
which Dean Rusk has called, "acts of tyranny
of the weak."
We hear that with our new relationship to
the USSR and China the Cold War is no more;
but in fact, the Cold War describes a
condition which can exist at any time with
differing sets of participants. The Cold War
came upon us as a surprise following World
War II-we were not prepared for it. We
thought that peace had come, but it had not.
Now we see that the Cold War and its variant,
the War of National Liberation, are forms of
hostility which can be used by anybody
against anybody-even against a great power
such as the United States.
When John F. Kennedy became President,
he was very much impressed with the danger
of this kind of unconventional warfare. He
had seen it in action in Southeast Asia on a
visit a few years before becoming President;
and as a result, upon becoming President he
immediately energized all the agencies of
government for the purpose of preparing to
cope with these kinds of threats. However, I
am sure that neither he nor any of his many
assistants who helped him organize the
counterinsurgency programs ever thought of
the United States as a possible target for the
techniques with which we were concerned.
Today we are aware that we are indeed
vulnerable to these tactics; that covert
aggression can indeed occur in the United
States, just as it has occurred elsewhere, and
hence that subversive insurgency at home
must be included among enemy tactics for
which we must prepare.
Thus we see that in this period we are

confronted with the problem of numerous
exposed targets, more troublemakers, varied
enemy tactics. Unfortunately, we seem to be
moving into this period in a condition of
diminishing strength. The Vietnam syndrome
is a term used to refer to the complex of
doubts, inhibitions and psychoses which have
grown out of our experience in South
Vietnam. The evidence is strong that this
syndrome is sapping the vigor that we have
shown in the past-our willingness to
undertake risks and our steadfastness under
pressure. There are many indications that the
sources of the strength upon which we have
drawn in the past are drying up as we enter
the present decade.
These are some of the reasons why, in my
judgment, we must regard the threats to
national security as something broader than a
military challenge by military power carried
out by military methods. The issue is not
simply a matter of clarifying words, it is not
merely a question of greater exactitude of
language. Its importance is the need to
stimulate appropriate adjustments of national
behavior to a changing problem. As long as we
think of national security primarily as
protection against military action by military
means, the average citizen will never feel that
sense of personal involvement before the
shooting starts. Furthermore, when our
interests are threatened, we shall first think of
the sword and then perhaps, reflecting upon
the disastrous experience of Vietnam, we shall
decide to do nothing. Just as in military
strategy we need options between a tripwire
defense and total nuclear war, in national
strategy we need nonmilitary options
available for possible use before resorting to
military actions.
Perhaps it is because we have rarely
thought of our diplomatic, economic and
psychological resources as part of the arsenal
of security that we have never learned to use
these tools effectively, and hence have
developed little confidence in them. If we
came to view them as essential components of
the national power available to advance our
world interests in integration with military
power, we would have taken a long step
forward in reinforcing our security. In
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bringing a wider range of new situations under
the rubric of national security we would, at
the same time, broaden the circumstances
requiring a standard of civic behavior reserved
in the past for times of overt war-all of this
to the benefit of our national unity.
Now I propose that we accept for a
moment my thesis that some such broadened
concept of national security is indeed
essential and take it as the starting point for
the construction of what I'm going to call "a
rational national security program." If you
are not satisfied with the broadened concept,
we can return to it later.
CRITERIA FOR A NEW DEFENSE PROGRAM

Let's ask ourselves, "What would be the
criteria of a defense program which would
meet this expanded concept?" I would point
to three or four conditions which I think our
program would have to meet. First, it must
make sense to our citizens who will have to
pay for the program. They must be convinced
that both the security concept and the
resulting defense program make sense, and as
a poor past performer in this field of
explaining security to the public I will be the
first to say that we have not done a good job
in the past. Except in times of war, with an
overt enemy on our doorstep, we have rarely
been able to make our citizens understand the
need to maintain large Armed Forces in a
fighting posture. So one condition for our
program is that it be easily explained, and be
clearly sensible-no effort to fortify the moon
or to protect the United States against every
possible threat. Let us recognize publicly that

"NOTHING BUT DISASTER CAN
RESULT FROM THE FAILURE
OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE."

there is no such thing as absolute safety in
this world, neither for us as individuals nor
for us as a nation. Hence we should merely
try to get reasonable protection for most of
our important assets at a cost the country can
afford, and will be willing to pay for during
the long pull.
The next criterion of our program is to
show that it relies upon the deterrence of war,
particularly nuclear war, and has faith in
deterrence. We talk a good deterrence game in
the Pentagon but frequently we act in
contradiction thereto. I refer primarily to the
deterrence of strategic nuclear war-the use of
nuclear weapons in major conflict. Nothing
but disaster can result from the failure of
strategic deterrence. We must be successful in
constructing forces that will prevent the use
of t h e s e w e a p o n s for fear of the
consequences, otherwise we're lost. If
deterrence fails, we've had it! Yet in practice
we don't design our military programs, or
haven't in the past, to show that we really
accept that fact, and that we're putting all our
money on deterrence when we design our
strategic forces. If we did, long ago we would
have eliminated or vastly reduced many of the
hedges against the failure of deterrence which
have been in past programs, and still are. I
refer to such things as redundant strategic
weapons systems, continental air defense, civil
defense, stockpiling against post-strike
damage, and the forces for deployment
overseas after nuclear D-day. Those are some
of the hedges upon which we've always spent
vast sums of money. A program that I would
consider convincing would take those facts
into account, recognize past errors, and adjust
the force structure accordingly to eliminate
the hedges.
The third criterion for this program would
be that it must assure some limited war
option for the President. We must set up our
forces so that it is possible for a President to
have a military instrument to reinforce

national policy, and if necessary to wage
limited war. This may not be a difficult p o i n t
to make with a military audience, but can
assure you that its feasibility is one of the
great questions arising from our experience in
Vietnam.
Is limited war a truly feasible option for
the President of this great democracy? Will
not the next President be faced with the same
dilemma which confronted Presidents
Johnson and Kennedy? In case of minor
provocations requiring a military response, are
we going to run the danger of a prolonged
Vietnam kind of war because we're timid and
hesitant in the use of our power, or are we
going to use our power decisively and quickly,
and run the risk of escalation, perhaps even
escalation into general war? Or frightened by
those two unattractive alternatives, shall we
do nothing? That, I call the three-horned
dilemma of limited war, and our program
must find some answers for it.
A fourth criterion is that our program must
take into account the internal threat of which
we are becoming aware. It is difficult to
evaluate its dimensions at the present, but
certainly it is a matter warranting very close
attention.
The final requirement for our program is
budgetary feasibility. All these things we are
discussing will cost money. They all mean big
budgets which have to be justified carefully.
We must make every effort to find
compensatory economies, and look for them
in areas such as the hedges against the failure
of deterrence, which I mentioned. Also there
are costly overlapping service missions-we
still have them. They've always been around.
Our overseas deployments-are they all
necessary? What about the role of our reserve
forces? Many of you represent the reserve
forces, and this is a field in which you can
make a great contribution to the discussions
at the War College. Finally, we should
scrutinize our international commitments
which are the basis for many of the fiscal
requirements of national security. We have
many of these about the world at the present
time. Are they all justified or not?
In summary, the kind of defense program
which I think would be consistent with our

modified concept of national security, would
be adequate for our true needs, and
furthermore would constitute a financial
burden which we could bear over the long
pull, would meet these points:
It would be designed to be readily
explained and justified to the public.
It would maximize the deterrent effect of
our strategic forces, put all our money on
deterrence, and leave virtually nothing for the
hedges against the failure of deterrence.
It would provide a limited war option for
the President and also would take into
account the need for nonmilitary and military
means for dealing with the Cold War and with
the internal threat.
SALIENT FEATURES OF A NEW
DEFENSE PROGRAM

The remainder of my talk is simply to
point out some of the salient features of a
concrete program in consonance with the
foregoing considerations.
I would think that our first step would be
the review of commitments which I have
suggested as being necessary. When I was
Chief of Staff of the Army in the '50s I had a
chart on the wall in my office which showed
the globe and all the political commitments
which our country had undertaken in the
post-World War I I period with potential
military implications. There were 42 nations
to whom we had made such commitments,
and the very thought of the limitations of our
military capabilities in that period always
made my hair curl.
Gentlemen, we have essentially those same
4 2 commitments today. They haven't
changed. In spite of Vietnam, in spite of the
experience we have acquired, they are still on
the books. It was a surprise to me that the
Nixon Administration, when it came in, did
not initiate a review of our commitments to
revalidate them or to discard those which had
outlived their usefulness. That kind of job has
never been done. It remains to be done, and I
would put it at the top of the actions to be
taken, if indeed we are going to have a
rational security program.
The second step would be to provide

security against plausible threats which our
citizens can readily recognize. They are the
threats of nuclear war; of limited war, both
small and large; and Cold War, to include the
internal threat previously mentioned.
Now just a f e w words regarding each one of
these threats. What kind of strategic
retaliatory forces should we have if our
purpose is to maximize their deterrent effect,
and to put all of our eggs in the basket of
deterrence with little concern for what will
happen if deterrence fails? I can visualize a
strategic retaliatory force of maximized
deterrence consisting of three components:
weapons, leaders, and a command and control
system. Its effectiveness would be derived not
from size, not from numbers, but from
excellence, quality, reliability, and above all,
invulnerability. The force itself would be the
very best force we could put together, finite
in size, but thoroughly protected, with great
attention paid t o the survival of the command
and control system-something we have never
done in the past.
It is interesting t o reflect on the meaning of
deterrence. What are its elements? What goes
into deterrence? It's something one cannot
weigh or evaluate precisely. It is not
something that can be worked out on a slide
rule because of the many spiritual factors
involved. But certainly you would think that
the leaders of any hostile power would be
deterred from attacking us if they knew that
several hundred missiles w h i c h could be
expected to hit their targets were concealed,
hardened or dispersed on the ground, in the
air, or in the sea, responsive to the command
of potential leaders linked to their weapons
by invulnerable communications. Of course,
these leaders would have t o be men of
character obviously capable of pushing the
button if they had to do it.
Now how to create that kind of deterrent
image is a problem I'm raising with you: how
to have a retaliatory force in which all of
those factors of deterrence are maximized to
the greatest degree possible. I think it could
be done along the lines suggested above,
although it has never been attempted.
So much on the concept of a deterrent
retaliatory force. Next, how do we get the

limited war option which I have talked
about?
I would begin by accepting the volunteer
force concept-reluctant as I have been thus
far to believe in its soundness, either from a
military or social point of view. I would
visualize forming from volunteers what I
would call, for want of a better term, "an
all-volunteer quick reaction force," which
would be our general purpose reserve available
t o t h e President for limited military
operations. It would be located principally in
the United States, but also would include the
forces which are permanently deployed
overseas. I would hope that those
deployments, as a result of our review of
c o m m i t m e n t s , would be substantially
r e d u c e d ; i n particular, the European
deployment. The latter causes me problems
for a number of reasons.
When President de Gaulle took France out
of military NATO and forced us to roll up our
line of communications across France, he
really forced us back into the tripwire
concept of the defense of Western Europe. I
say that as the one who fought vigorously for
years against the tripwire concept. But it is
perfect nonsense today as all of you in
uniform will recognize, I believe, to have a
large army deployed in Europe with a line of
communications parallel to its front, leading
up to Bremerhaven, and no room for
maneuver in depth. It is impossible to have a
viable supply system, such as is required by a
conventional military defense of Western
Europe. Oddly, this is a point which has never
been raised openly against our deployments
to Europe, but it will be in time.
I say that because we saw in the last session
of Congress how Senator Mansfield and many
other respected senators were bent on
reducing our deployments in Europe. We in
uniform had better anticipate a renewal of
their efforts, and had better accept the fact
that a reduction is coming sooner or later and
decide how to cope with it. I would take the
position that our NATO deployment at the
present moment is still justified for political
reasons associated with the Germans and their
future reactions and future behavior; and also
by the possibility of negotiations which result

in a mutual withdrawal of forces in Western
Europe. Until we see clearly how those two
factors are to be accommodated, I would say
we should retain our present deployments.
But from a military point of view, for the
reasons I have just stated, it makes no sense to
have so many troops exposed in Europe as
they are, and it is self-delusion to assume the
possibility of reinforcing them and sustaining
a conventional major conflict in Western
Europe.
So before setting up this "quick reaction
force" I would hope that we could reduce our
fixed commitments overseas, and then try to
have the best elite force we can put together
from the three services available to the
President to provide a clearly viable limited
war option. But its capability would be
limited. It could not undertake tasks which it
could not carry out with its own forces, as
there would be no plan for a rapid
mobilization to raise additional forces. I shall
return to this point in a moment.
That, in general terms, is the kind of quick
reaction force which I would like to see us
develop-elite, all-volunteer, with the best of
equipment but limited in size by two factors:
one, the ability to get high quality volunteers
of the type we must insist upon; and second,
the ability to get enough money to pay for
such an expensive force. The need for this
force would be justified not by the so-called
NATO commitment, which is becoming
rapidly invalid, but on the multiple
contingencies worldwide which may arise
without emphasizing any particular one.
You may ask what happens if this force
embarks on something that appears to be a
little brushfire and it doesn't turn out that
way. How do we cope with an unexpectedly
large contingency? My answer is that we will
have a mobilization capability behind this
quick reaction force, but we will accept the
fact that mobilization cannot produce major
forces for about a year. I don't think that
concession is much of a liability because we
have never been able to do better in the past;
in fact we can't do better today. We have had
many, many plans for the purpose of
increasing the combat readiness of our reserve
forces-reserve units have worked extremely

hard trying to reach these standards, but at no
time in my experience have we had reserve
forces ready to be deployed overseas into
combat on the heels of the departing forces of
the regular establishment. In another way, the
fact that a major military effort will take time
is not all bad. It may permit us to ponder the
wisdom of a large scale military intervention
and avoid another situation like Vietnam
where our foreign policy outran popular
support.
RISKS

Now let me just point out some of the risks
which are contained in my proposals. There
are some rather serious ones.
There is our reliance on deterrence and our
refusal to hedge against its failure, I think,
that makes a lot of sense, but maybe things
won't turn out the way we visualize them in
the outbreak of nuclear war. Then there is our
dependence on volunteers. Perhaps we can't
get enough volunteers at the price we're
willing to pay.
Finally, there is my proposed reduction of
levels of readiness of conventional forces. I
have often reflected on how much money and
effort we have expended in the Armed Forces
over the years to try to attain an instant
readiness capability which often was not
needed and almost never attained. Now if we
are willing to accept the fact that we are going
to mobilize deliberately, we can plan
realistically and avoid waste on unattainable
objectives. Furthermore, we will avoid
creating illusions in the minds of our civilian
leaders as to the things we can do in a crisis.
I recall shortly after I reported for duty to
President Kennedy in '61, just back from civil
life, he made a speech in which the Army had
suggested a paragraph saying that we were
going to get National Guard divisions ready
for deployment into combat with eight weeks
of training. With all respect to the Guard it
just could not have been done; you can't get
even regular units ready at that rate. So we
were fooling a new President. It was not
intentional, but nonetheless the Army
authorities were giving him misleading
information which could have been a serious

disservice had the President ever acted in
accordance with it.
COMPENSATIONS

So much for risks in our program. What are
some of the compensations we would get
from it? First, we will be putting our big
money on deterrence where it belongs, and
not on costly preparations to meet conditions
following a f i r s t strike. Next, we would be
eliminating many of the personnel problems
which have plagued the Armed Forces,
particularly the Army, as a result of the draft.
To get rid of the draft and of the unhappy or
disloyal soldier would be of enormous value
to us. I believe, as Gideon did, that I too
would much rather have a few hundred
reliable men rather than the 32,000 Gideon
had at the outset of the Midianite Campaign,
which included the fearful. The Armed Forces
will be so much better off, both as a fighting
force and as a social force, if they stand for
quality and not for numbers.
By these means we have provided the
President with an elite force available, not for
major military operations, but for doing those
things which are time-sensitive-crises which
have to be met in a comparatively short
period of time with limited forces. Being
small and all-volunteer, it has a good chance
t o remain f r e e f r o m unreasonable
Congressional restraints on Presidential
authority as Commander-in-Chief.
These are real advantages, I believe,
advantages which in my judgment would
warrant the risks that we are running.
DEALING WITH THE INTERNAL THREAT

I still have one topic to discuss which I
mentioned at the outset. I have held it back
deliberately because it is the hardest to treat
and I will not try to deal with it with any
degree of thoroughness. What can be done
about the matter of the internal threat, about
the internal weaknesses we have perceived,
the existence of which certainly has an
enormous bearing upon our national security?
What can we do about this threat?
In the first place, we know that the causes

President Nixon with part of a "quick reaction force."

are highly complex, that they involve many
things that fall outside the purview of
bureaucratic means and methods. They
include such intangibles as the ideals, the
goals and the standards of our individual
citizens, their outlook on government, on
society, on life itself-all of which are beyond
governmental influences and derive from
h e r e d i t y , environment, and formative
institutions such as the home, the church, and
the school.
While there is no government department
charged with such matters as these there are, I
believe, a few common-sense measures that
can be taken, both by the government and by
the Armed Forces, which may do some good.
For one thing, the quality of government is
susceptible to vast improvement. Many of the
complaints of unhappy citizens arise from a
feeling that our government is not working,
that it is faced with problems of a breadth
which exceeds the capability of our present
procedures. They may even exceed the
capability of our constitutional government in
its present form.

A first improvement would be to get better
men t o Washington. You know the old army
principle-if you complain about the mess,
you get made mess officer. Well that principle
can be turned against our citizens who
complain about government. If they don't
like their government, let them come to
Washington and do something about it. Let
them join the government, t o the slogan
"Let's get the best heads of America in the
brass hats in Washington." We've never done
that in the past.
Another practical measure would be to
temper the impact of the arrival of a new
administration. It scares the bejeezus out of
you to see a new administration arrive in
Washington- able men usually; but in
fulfillment of tradition, they, the new rascals,
proceed to throw the old rascals out, and the
new rascals don't even know each other.
I saw this happen in the Kennedy period at
the time of the Bay of Pigs, a disaster which
was largely the result of just what I'm talking
about-a lot of able people coming to town
and taking on a very complex job without

"WE COULD IMPROVE NOT
ONLY OFFlClALS BUT ALSO
OUR PROCEDURES IN
GOVERNMENT."

-

knowing each other, not even knowing their
telephone numbers. You can smile about it,
but it is not amusing really, and there's no
reason why we can't do better. If the much
maligned military mind were asked for a
solution, the President would have the key
members of his new administration arrive in
town three months early for a summer session
at the National War College. There they
would get acquainted with each other; learn
the relation of their job to those of their
associates and get some appreciation of the
whole team of which they are a part. These
are elementary things but they have never
been done in our history. Unhappily, a new
official seems to feel it weakens his standing
to admit he doesn't know a11 about
government the day he arrives. But this can be
changed.
We could improve not only officials but
also our procedures in government. Some of
the justified complaints which we're hearing
from segments of our citizenship are directed
at the choice of national priorities-how we
decide whether to spend a billion dollars to go
to the moon, to build a housing project, or to
design a new missile. We have no
instrumentality in our federal government
that provides a forum for the discussion of
s u c h competitive programs and which
produces interdepartmental advice for the
President who has to make the ultimate
decision.
In the case of national security, we have
the National Security Council (NSC), which
has never been a perfect forum, but which
provides a useful focal point for dealing with
problems of foreign policy and national
security. The existence of the NSC gives the
impression to the advocates of competitive
nonmilitary programs that national security
issues enjoy a great advantage. That feeling is
general throughout the country, the feeling
that the little man with his local problem
cannot compete with the priorities given to
international and military projects. There is a

gap to be filled in our procedures to remove
this apprehension.
The excellence of the Armed Forces
themselves can be a contributing factor to
restoring national unity and pride. If indeed
we realize the kind of elite force which I have
tried to portray in my brief discussion here, it
can serve as a symbol of the quality of the
men and institutions which protect us from
our enemies, foreign and domestic.
I would like to think it possible to include
in a program for strengthening ourselves at
home, the development of some kind of code
of conduct for the publicity media. It is easy
to be critical of the media, but actually it is
very difficult to decide what do we want
done-do we want a free press or don't we?
Do we want to have free criticism of
government, or don't we? If we say, "Yes, we
do, but we want criticism to be constructive,"
what does that mean? Although it is hard to
state in specific t e r m s what we'd like to have
done, it is such an important matter that I
feel we must make the effort. I would hope
that the leaders of the media themselves
should take the lead in self-reform in view of
their heavy stake in the issue.
CONCLUSION

I would point out in closing our discussion
of rational national security that it is a subject
difficult to separate from our general welfare.
We've tried to make that separation in the
past. The Constitution talks about the
common defense and the general welfare as if
t h e y were two separate functions of
government. That situation has certainly
radically changed today. Both the functions
and the institutions involved in national
security and those concerned with the general
welfare draw their resources, their strength,
from the same sources of national power. The
protection of these sources of power requires
an integrated national policy which is not
arbitrarily divided. We cannot in the long run
overcome at home and fail abroad, o r succeed
at home and succumb overseas. Perhaps what
we need is a consolidated national program
for security and welfare bound together by
that same kind of rationality which we have
tried this morning to inject into our security
program by itself.

